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APPEALS FROM PRORATION ORDERS
FOR SMALL TRACT WELLS
by David G. McLane
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental and pervasive influence in the oil and gas industry
is the promulgation and implementation of conservation laws,1 legis-
lative restrictions on the basic Rule of Capture In Texas such a pro-
gram is administered by the Railroad Commission (termed the Com-
mission herein) by means of spacing and production regulations. The
problem arising from a small tract well is important in both facets
of conservation and poses additional difficulties in protecting correla-
tive rights within a reservoir. Much of the uncertainty in these areas
has been minimized by the enactment of the "Mineral Interest Pooling
Act," which became effective August 30, 1965. However, the
judicial law in this connection continues to apply both directly,
in situations not within the purview of the statute,' and indirectly,
as a basis for interpretation of the statute. In this latter regard,
it must be emphasized that Texas was one of the last two major
petroleum-producing states without a compulsory pooling statute'
and that an important stimulus for its enactment was the case law
development. The Pooling Act was not traumatic in origin or effect
but rather the natural product of an evolutionary process which began
in the courts. The statute's contribution was to clarify and define
' These have been held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio Oil
Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) (antiflaring statute) and by the Texas Supreme Court
in Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935). See also
Annot., 99 A.L.R. 1119 (1935).
' See text following note 67.
'This compulsory pooling statute was enacted by the legislature on February 24, 1965,
and signed by Governor Connally on March 4. It will be hereinafter referred to as the
"Pooling Act." Unless otherwise indicated, "section" references are to sections of Vernon's
Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 11, at 24 (1965), to be Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6008C
(1965).
'Section 2(f) of the Pooling Act expressly excludes pre-Normanna pools (prior to
March 8, 1961) from its province. There appears to be no reason why large-tract owners
could not utilize the statute to pool a small tract, although no express authorization to
that effect exists. If for some reason the Pooling Act were interpreted as being exclusively
for use by the small tract owner, the importance of case law in this area would be but
little diminished.
' Only Kansas now remains.
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the law which was already substantially in existence, and it should
be interpreted in that light.
Before the Pooling Act this small tract problem was handled by
means of both spacing (Rule 37 exception permits') and allowable
regulation, creating a complicated system for resolving conflicting
interests. Significant decisions affecting this unique aspect of oil and
gas law have been handed down recently by the Supreme Court of
Texas, and a number of questions have been resolved. It should be
remembered that both methods of dealing with the small tract prob-
lem are administered by the Commission.
II. THE RAILROAD COMMISSION
A. Constitutional And Statutory Genesis
Article XVI, Section 59 (a) of the Texas Constitution directs the
legislature to do whatever is necessary for the "conservation and de-
velopment of all of the natural resources of this State. . . ." In 1891
the Railroad Commission of Texas was established by constitutional
amendment, and its present powers are enunciated in the statutes.7
The power of the legislature to delegate enforcement powers to an
administrative agency such as the Commission, after promulgating
the basic conservation rules, has been upheld repeatedly.'
B. Scope Of Authority
The Commission possesses the exclusive authority to administer
the oil and gas conservation regulations of the state, but only to
prevent waste and protect correlative rights.! Railroad Commission
orders generally will be upheld if they reasonably relate to those
objectives," are supported by "substantial evidence,"" and are not
6 See discussion in text accompanying notes 26-46 infra.
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 6004-6066(d) (1962). The Commission has the power
to "make and enforce rules, regulations, or orders for the conservation of natural gas, to
prevent the waste thereof, and otherwise to accomplish the purposes of this Article.
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6008, § 6 (1962).
8 James v. Trustees of Eagle Pass Independent School Dist., 376 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964); Harris v. Municipal Gas Co., 59 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error
dism.; Gulf C. & S.F.R.R. v. State, 120 S.W. 1028 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) error ref. A
legislative delegation of rulemaking authority must fix definite standards in order to be
valid. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Falkner, 160 Tex. 417, 331 S.W.2d 917 (1960).
Delegation of authority is not unlawful where standards for exercise of discretion, though
general, are capable of reasonable application. Nichols v. City of Dallas, 347 S.W.2d 326
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.
"Railroad Comm'n v. Continental Oil Co., 157 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
error ref.; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6008, S 10 (1962).
" Railroad Comm'n v. Continental Oil Co., note 9 supra.
1 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937); Railroad Comm'n
v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962); Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 146 Tex.
286, 206 S.W.2d 235 (1947); Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424
(1946); Railroad Comm'n v. Fain, 161 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref.
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otherwise arbitrary, discriminatory, or unjust.'" Except with respect
to compulsory units under the Pooling Act, the Commission main-
tains continuing jurisdiction to amend or revoke prior orders and to
substitute new regulations therefor should conditions so demand. 3
The Commission has the power and duty "to inquire into the pro-
duction, storage, transportation, refining, reclaiming, treating, mar-
keting or processing of crude petroleum oil and natural gas .. .in
order to determine whether or not waste exists or is imminent, or
whether the oil and gas conservation laws of Texas . . . are being
violated."" Furthermore, upon verified complaint of any interested
party that waste is taking place or is "reasonably imminent," the Rail-
road Commission may hold a hearing and, if it agrees, "shall make
such rule, regulation or order as in its judgment is reasonably required
to correct, prevent or lessen such waste. ' ' '"
C. Judicial Review Of Commission Proceedings
Section 8 of article 6049c allows any interested person to sue "in
a Court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County, Texas," against
the Railroad Commission "to test the validity of said laws, rules,
regulations or orders."'" Under the Pooling Act, however, venue lies
in the district court of the county in which the land or any part
thereof is located, notwithstanding the aforementioned section.'7 Al-
though the Supreme Court of Texas can also review Commission
rules regulating the production of oil and gas, neither court can
substitute its judgments or standards for those of the agency." The
Commission's laws, rules, orders and regulations are presumed valid,
the burden of proving their invalidity falling upon the complaining
party.'" With respect to the prevention of waste,
the Commission should be left reasonably free to exercise its sound
judgment and discretion. The Commission should bear in mind, how-
Texas employs a hybrid of the usual substantial evidence rule in that the court, in re-
viewing the order, is not limited to reviewing only the record made in the Commssion's
hearing below, but may entertain new evidence at the trial court level.
" Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937); Brown v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935).
" See notes 134-36 infra and accompanying text.
14Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6049c, § 5 (1962).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6049c, § 7 (1962).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6049c, § 8 (1962).
17 Section 2 (g).
"Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 162 Tex. 274, 346 S.W.2d 801 (1961). The
courts will not "prescribe any rule or standard to guide the commission, except that its
action must be legal, reasonable, and not arbitrary." Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,
126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, rehearing denied, 87 S.W.2d 1069, 1070 (1935).
"Railroad Comm'n v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 130 Tex. 484, 109 S.W.2d 967 (1937);




ever, that it is its duty to conserve oil and gas above ground as well as
below . . . [T]he Commission must be fair, and must not indulge in
unreasonable discriminations between different oil fields, or between
different tracts of land in the same field. In determining the issue of
fairness or discrimination, some latitude must be allowed, because the
subject of administration is so vast, complex, and complicated that its
administrative agency cannot be placed in an absolute strait jacket."
In reviewing a Commission action the courts will not investigate the
methods adopted for conserving oil nor the motive or purpose which
prompted them."' They will not substitute their notions of expediency
and fairness for those of the agency to which the formulation and
execution of the conservation policy of the state have been entrusted.
In most cases, judicial review is thus limited to determining whether
a particular rule, regulation or order is within the delegated authority
of the Commission, not whether the particular action is the proper
means to accomplish its objective.' The issue is whether the rule,
regulation or order is reasonably supported by "substantial evidence."
Chief Justice Calvert stated the general rule in his dissent in Coloma:"
"Art. 6049c, Sec. 8 ... expressly provides that the order of the Com-
mission 'shall be deemed prima facie valid' and that on appeal to the
district court 'the burden of proof that the order is not supported by
substantial evidence is upon the party complaining' of the order.""2
This likewise should hold true under the Pooling Act.
III. THE RULE 37 EXCEPTION
The unusual nature of prior treatment of the small tract problem
arose by virtue of the basic spacing regulation in Texas, Rule 37, and
its exceptions. Before the evolutionary development of the Pooling
Act and the conceptual milieu preceding it can be fully appreciated,
one must understand the nature and origin of this important spacing
rule.
"°Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 134 Tex. 59, 79, 131 S.W.2d 73, 85 (1939).
As Mr. Justice Holmes said in Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, "We must remember that the
machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its
joints." 282 U.S. 499, 500 (1931).
1 Railroad Comm'n v. Galveston Chamber of Commerce, 105 Tex. 101, 145 S.W. 573
(1912).
22 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 162 Tex. 274, 346 S.W.2d 801 (1961);
Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940).
"And even then only if such rule, regulation, or order is not reasonably supported
by "substantial evidence." See generally Harris, A Reappraisal of the Substantial Evidence
Rule in Texas Administrative Law, 3 Sw. L.J. 416 (1949); Larson, The Substantial Evi-
dence Rule, 5 Sw. L.J. 152 (1951); Walker, The Application of the Substantial Evidence
Rule in Appeals from Orders of the Railroad Commission, 32 Texas L. Rev. 639 (1954).2
1Coloma Oil & Gas Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex. 483, 358 S.W.2d 566 (1962).
25Id. at 495, 358 S.W.2d at 569. It should be noted that the Chief Justice's dissent
is a valid statement of the law absent the peculiarities of that fact situation.
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A. History and Purpose
The constitutional power of an administrative body such as the
Commission to make spacing rules has been sustained in the United
States Supreme Court.i' The first well-spacing rule in the United
States was promulgated by the Commission in 1919, viz., Statewide
Rule 37.7 The objective" of the rule is the prevention of waste, i.e.,
the conservation of resources, constituting thereby a modification of
the basic Rule of Capture. "
Subsection (A) (1) of Rule 37 now provides that no well shall
be drilled less than 1200 feet from any other well on the same tract
or farm nor less than 467 feet from any property line, lease line or
subdivision line; thus, the general rule is one well per forty-acre
tract." However, subsection (D) reserves to the Commission the right
to enter special orders altering these distances. This is the renowned
"Rule 37 Exception" which allows well permits for tracts of less than
forty acres. Its primary purpose is to protect correlative rights within
a pool and to allow each mineral owner a fair chance to produce the
oil and gas underlying his tract.' "Every tract, however small, having
a separate existence prior to the application of the rule [37] to the
vicinity, is entitled to one well, as a matter of right"'" if essential for
the avoidance of waste or prevention of confiscation. Because the right
to an exception permit is predicated on preventing confiscation, the
protection is afforded the owner and not the tract."
B. Voluntary Subdivision Rule
"[N]o subdivision of property made subsequent to the adoption
" The Court refused to review a holding that the power was constitutional in Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). See also Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil & Producing
Co., 16 F.2d 639 (N.D. Tex. 1926); Railroad Comm'n v. Bass, 10 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928).
7 Rule 37, and the granting of exceptions thereto, was held constitutional as a reason-
able exercise of the police power in Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83
S.W.2d 935 (1935) and cases cited therein.
" See discussion in Myers, Pooling and Unitization 11 (1957).
as"Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424 (1946); Brown v. Hitchcock,
235 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref.; Nash v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 120
S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism. w.o.j.
" Rule 37(B), Texas Railroad Comm'n Rules & Regs., § 1, at 16 (June, 1964). This
minimum should continue under the Pooling Act, which basically sets maxinums of 160
acres for oil units and 640 acres for gas units "plus 10% tolerance." Section 2(a).
" The legislature can regulate for the protection of correlative rights even in absence
of waste. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex.
509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945).
"
2 Meyers, Common Ownership and Conlrol in Spacing Cases, 31 Texas L. Rev. 19
(1952).
asRailroad Comm'n v. Williams, 163 Tex. 370, 356 S.W.2d 131 (1962) (ownership
of other producing properties in same pool protected plaintiff against confiscation-permit
denied); Coloma Oil & Gas Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex. 483, 358 S.W.2d 566
(1962) (the other producng properties need not be contiguous before permit is denied);
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 137 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)
(drainage of plaintiff's land offset by drainage onto it-permit denied).
[Vol. 19:304
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[for a particular field] of the original spacing rule will be considered
in determining whether or not any property is being confiscated
within the terms of such spacing rule .. .. ." Thus, a Rule 37 excep-
tion permit may not be issued for a "voluntary subdivision." The
date this rule attaches to a field is "the date of discovery of oil or gas
production in a certain continuous reservoir regardless of the sub-
sequent lateral extensions of such reservoir . . .", This restriction on
the issuance of exception permits prevents circumvention and is
essential to the preservation of Rule 37 itself."' It is often called the
"rule of May 29th" (the date of its adoption in 1934) and has been
held by the Supreme Court of Texas 7 to be a valid and enforceable
amendment to Rule 37. A liberalization of this rule exists in the
Rule of the Century Case,"' whereby a tract "voluntarily subdivided"
may be reconstructed and granted an exception permit if none of
the subdivisions would otherwise be entitled to a well."
C. Compensation Through Allowables
The Commission is able to offset the initial advantage obtained by
one who is given an exception to the well-spacing rule by limiting his
production." In this way the Commission can accomplish simul-
taneously its goals of both preventing waste and affording each owner
the opportunity of fully developing and recovering his share of pro-
duction. The utilization of allowables is the second great instrument
of the Commission for conserving oil and gas and is a valid exercise
of power for the prevention of waste and confiscation.4' In determin-
ing the total state allowable, the Commission relies to some extent on
34 Rule 37(G)(1), Texas Railroad Comm'n Rules & Regs., § 1, at 16 (June, 1964).
See also Meyers, supra note 32, at 19-20.
35 Rule 37(G) (3), Texas Railroad Comm'n Rules & Regs., § 1, at 16 (June 1964).
'"Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73 (1939); Brown
v. Hitchcock, 235 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref.; Humble Oil & Ref. Co.
v. Lasseter, 120 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism.; Nash v. Shell Petroleum
Corp., 120 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism. w.o.j.
"TGulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73 (1959). The
court stated that the "more wells, more oil" theory, even if established as valid, does not
justify an exception well, for such basis, if allowed, would nullify the rule. See also Trapp
v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424 (1946); Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co.,
139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942).
"'Railroad Comm'n v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 130 Tex. 484, 109 S.W.2d 967 (1937).
"9 Inequities arise here since whoever gets the permit for the reconstructed-tract well
on his land cannot be forced to share proceeds with other owners in the tract. Ryan
Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221, 285 S.W.2d 201 (1955). See Meyers,
supra note 32, at 20. With the advent of the compulsory pooling system this inequity is
practically eliminated.
4 Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 313, 83 S.W.2d 935, 944 (1935);
Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Gregg, 337 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 96 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
"'Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940); Brown v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., supra note 40; Kraker v. Railroad Comm'n, 188 S.W.2d 912
(Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
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the monthly estimated demand for petroleum and its products pub-
lished by the Bureau of Mines." The Commission also obtains nomi-
nations, which reveal the quantities of oil which purchasers anticipate
buying during the subsequent month, at its monthly "statewide hear-
ing." The total state allowable, which must be divided among all the
fields without unnecessary discrimination," is announced at this
hearing. Regardless of the demand, no well is permitted to produce
in excess of its maximum efficient rate," and any proration must be
"among the various producers of a reasonable basis."'
IV. FAIR SHARE AND THE RULE OF CAPTURE
If a Rule 37 exception permit is granted to drill a well on a tract
smaller than that generally required under the spacing regulations and
a producing well is completed, the allocation of allowables among pro-
ducers from that reservoir can present a conflict between ownership
in place and the law of capture. This basic conceptual conflict was an
important underlying issue in Normanna" and its successors, develop-
ing the idea of "fair share," and is of continued importance under
the Pooling Act.
The rule of capture "simply is that the owner of a tract of land
acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces from wells on his
land, though part of the oil or gas may have migrated from adjoin-
ing lands."4 Probably the most famous of the early cases enunciating
the rule was Barnard v. Monogahela Natural Gas Company,"' which
advised an adjacent landowner that his only remedy was to "go and
do likewise."" In Texas there is even some legislative direction of
uncompensated drainage in the Marginal Well Statute,"' but basically
42 See discussion in Myers, Pooling and Unitization 4, 9 (1957).
43 See Greenhill & McGinnis, Practice and Procedure in Oil and Gas Hearings in Texas,
18 Sw. L.J. 406, 407-08 (1964).
"Railroad Comm'n v. Continental Oil Co., 157 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
error ref.
42 Meyers, supra note 32, at 20.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6049c, S 7 (1962).47 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 162 Tex. 274, 346 S.W.2d 801 (1961),
noted in 16 Sw. L.J. 320 (1962) (hereinafter referred to as Normanna).4SElliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 581, 210 S.W.2d 558, 561-62 (1948).
See also Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221, 285 S.W.2d 281 (1956);
Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, (1935); Stephens Co.
v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923) (rule of capture in
conjunction with ownership in place); General Crude Oil Co. v. Harris, 101 S.W.2d 1098
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
49216 Pa. 362, 65 At. 801 (1907).
'°Id. at 802. The first rule of capture case in the United States, however, was West-
moreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 Atl. 724 (1889). See also
Myers, Pooling and Unitization 18 (1957) and Note, 17 Sw. L.J. 674 (1963).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 6049b, § 1 (1962) sets minimum allowables on
particular wells according to their depths, regardless of any resultant waste or uncompen-
sated drainage. See also Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573
(1940); Op. Att'y. Gen. (Tex.) 1845 (Jan. 17, 1940); Note, 24 Texas L. Rev. 519 (1946).
[Vol. 19:304
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the rule of capture is subject to the conservation regulations enacted
under the state police power.
A. Atlantic3 And Halbouty"
The concept of "fair share," emphasized in these two recent
supreme court cases, which seeks to give each landowner the right to
recover minerals underlying his tract, has been discussed at length
in an article by Robert E. Hardwicke and M. K. Woodward, in which
the rule was stated to be:
When a statute or regulation thereunder has the effect of permitting
one owner to produce more than his fair share, thereby giving the
opportunity of draining the excess from the land of others who are
denied the opportunity to produce their fair shares, confiscation of
property and denial of equal protection of the laws result, and the
statute or regulation is invalid, unless the drainage takes place as an
unavoidable result of reasonable regulation to prevent waste."
This concept had been foreshadowed in the lower courts of this state
as early as 1936,56 as well as in the later Texas Supreme Court cases
of Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co." and Marrs v. Railroad
Comm'n." Its fundamental influence is manifest even in the Pooling
Act.
In Normanna (a Rule 37 exception case with a generous small-
tract allowable) the court declared invalid a 1/3-2/3 gas allocation
order' which would have allowed a .3 acre tract to produce over 200
times as much gas per acre as a well on a 320 acre unit. Even though
the original value of gas in place under the small tract was only
$7000, gas valued at some $2,500,000 would have been produced by
the well on the .3 acre tract during the estimated life of the field.
"Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945).5
3Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 162 Tex. 274, 346 S.W.2d 801 (1961),
noted in 16 Sw. L.J. 320 (1962).
"Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex. 417, 357 S.W.2d 364 (1962), cert. denied
sub noa. Dillon v. Halbouty, 371 U.S. 888 (1962), noted in 17 Sw. L.J. 674 (1963)
(also referred to herein as Port Acres).
55 Hardwicke & Woodward, Fair Share and the Small Tract in Texas, 41 Texas L. Rev.
75, 83 (1962).
""The right of each individual leaseholder extends no further than the opportunity to
extract his fair share of the oil, measured by a reasonable approximation of the amount
of oil in place under his leasehold." Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 93
S.W.2d 587, 588 (Tex. Civ. App 1936) error ref. (Emphasis added.)
5' 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73 (1939). "It is the law that every owner or lessee of
land is entitled to a fair chance to recover the oil and gas in or under his land, or their
equivalents in kind. Any denial of such fair chance would be 'confiscation' within the
meaning of Rule 37 and the Rule of May 29th." Id. at 71, 131 S.W.2d at 80. See also
Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 94 S.W.2d 1240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)
error ref.
"142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W.2d 941 (1944).
"That is, one-third of the pool allowable divided equally among the wells and two-
thirds in the proportion that the individual well bears to the total field acreage.
1965 ]
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The Commission's response was the Normanna Fields Special Order
No. 2-46673,o which set the basic allowable for the entire field on
a 100 per cent surface acreage basis. However, any owner of a tract
of less than 100 acres, entitled to a Rule 37 exception permit, can
obtain a special allowable upon proof that such allowable is eco-
nomically necessary and that all adjoining tract-owners have "refused
to allow the pooling of said tract with enough of said immediately
adjacent acreage to create a drilling unit of at least 100 acres upon
fair and reasonable terms. . ". ."" This latter prerequisite, a "reasonable
offer to voluntarily pool," is codified in the Pooling Act." The pro-
vision is rather unique among compulsory pooling statutes, a fact
which further evidences the important influence of the case law upon
this statute. It is apparent that such arbitrary formulas as that in
Normanna will not be upheld by the supreme court, at least with
respect to newly-discovered reservoirs," because they are not reason-
ably calculated to adequately protect correlative rights. The protec-
tion of correlative rights, being a jurisdictional limitation on the
Commission's powers, necessarily qualifies that agency's authority
under the Pooling Act as well. Since the Commission's duties regard-
ing allowables remain unchanged by the Pooling Act, Texas courts
will continue to be called upon to determine the propriety of allo-
cation formulas between units." Moreover, even within a compulsory
unit the Commission must determine participation percentages, and
the courts will be importuned, therefore, to consider such determina-
tions-a situation highly analogous to Normanna and its successors.
B. Limitations On Fair Share
Inherent in the rule of fair share were two exceptions, with impli-
cations of a third. The Normanna case itself instituted the first-the
precedence of the demands of conservation and the prevention of
waste. It was noted there that the Commission is responsible for
devising a proration rule which will conserve the gas in the field and
be fair and just to all parties."
6
0Texas Railroad Comm'n Rules & Regs., § 7, at 917, 14 0. & G.R. 885 (1961).
6lid. at 918 (Nov. 1961). Similar disparities existed in the Port Acres situation with
similar results. In that case each one-acre lot relied on drainage for 92.87% of its con-
densate recovery. Wells having .65% of the total surface acreage received 14.6% of the
allowable, and small tracts with 1.77% of the producing sand would have recovered
20.46% of the gas and condensate of the field. Special Order No. 3-51035 (March 1,
1963) resulted. Commissioner Jim C. Langdon discusses this order in The Influence of
Court Decisions upon Railroad Commission Policy in Rule 37 Cases and the Allocation of
Allowables to the Small Tract Well, 22 Oil and Gas Compact Bulletin 100 (1963).6
2 Section 2 (a).
63 See notes 104 and 105 infra and accompanying text.
" Disputes will, of course, be much less frequent without the large tract-exception
tract dichotomy.




The second exception, declared by the court in the Marrs case,"
is that the order must not require unnecessary expense in obtaining
the fair share. In that case the court ruled that Gulf Oil did not have
to drill additional wells to increase its total allowable sufficiently for
recovery of its fair share because present wells were adequate with
an increased allowable. The underlying rationale was that the re-
quirement of such unnecessary expense is in itself no less a confisca-
tion than declaring an insufficient allowable.
These two limitations on fair share were important motivating
factors behind passage of the Pooling Act, which in effect harmonizes
these previously antithetical demands and provides each owner with
more nearly his fair share, with minimal waste, and without un-
necessary expense. Normanna also implies the third limitation, con-
cerning timely complaint, which will be hereinafter considered."
C. The Status Of Rule Of Capture
Fundamentally, there are two alternative theories of ownership:
either rule of capture modified to protect correlative rights, or own-
ership in place modified to prevent waste. Although the court in
Halbouty seemed to lean in the direction of the latter, recent cases s
indicate a recognition of the administrative difficulties involved under
that interpretation"' and somewhat of a withdrawal therefrom. The
Texas Supreme Court, while having enunciated both theories, has
generally adhered to the rule of capture as the less complicated, more
workable solution." "The property right is not in oil and gas as such;
it is the right to a 'fair chance' or 'reasonable opportunity' to produce
or receive oil and gas in his land or the equivalent amount."' In-
deed, Justice Greenhill, in the most recent supreme court decision in
this area,7' pointed out that in a Rule 37 exception permit case the
landowner is entitled only to a fair chance to recover the oil and
gas in and under his tract. "But in determining the validity of a
field-wide proration order, the landowner is not wholly restricted to
a recovery of reserves underlying his tract. The test . . . is whether
he has an opportunity to produce his fair share of the minerals in
"Marrs v. Railroad Comm'n, 142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W.2d 941 (1944).
67 See notes 111-123 infra and accompanying text.
"' Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1964);
Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1964).
19 See note 21 supra and accompanying text. See also Kuntz, The Law of Capture, 10
Okla. L. Rev. 406 (1957); Note, 17 Sw. L.J. 674, 677 (1962).
70 Japhet v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925); Ryan Consol. Petroleum
Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221, 285 S.W.2d 210 (1956).
71 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 93 S.W.2d 587, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936) error ref. See also Hardwicke & Woodward, Fair Share and the Small Tract in
Texas, 41 Texas L. Rev. 75, 94 (1962).
7 Pickens v. Railroad Comm'n, 387 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1965) (Fairway Field case).
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the reservoir.""5 The Halbouty case has been analyzed to the same
effect."4 Although art. 6008"M modifies the rule of capture, with re-
spect to allowables, to protect correlative rights to the extent prac-
tical, that rule remains the law in cases in which no allowables have
been established and no adjacent owners have drilled wells. Halbouty
"should be taken merely as demonstrating reasonable police power
modification of the rule of capture, not a new rule of property
based on ownership in place."7
V. SHELL77 AND ALCOA"8 CASES
Further refinements of Normanna and Port Acres crystalized when
the Texas Supreme Court handed down its decisions in Shell and
Alcoa on May 27, 1964. The Shell case" concerned an oil proration
order based on a fifty per cent per well and fifty per cent acreage
formula, issued by the Commission on June 27, 1962, after extensive
hearings. Motion for rehearing was timely filed with the Commission
on July 11 and overruled on July 18. Shell filed suit in the state
district court in Travis County, Texas, on August 8 to contest the
order. 0
The Alcoa cases" was an attack on a Commission order which had
been adopted for the entire Appling Field, by temporary order, on
January 30, 1961.8 The field was a complicated multi-reservoir field
yielding primarily gas in thirty-eight separately-prorated gas reser-
voirs, due to "various zones which [were] separated vertically [and
which were] broken into separate fault blocks or segments.""s All
prior orders, regarding reservoirs discovered earlier (dating back to
1956), and orders concerning fields not previously having special
field rules were synthesized into this single order, which recited that
7 3 1 d at 42.
74 Discussion note, 16 0. & G.R. 813 (1962).
78 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6008 (1962).
7 8 Discussion note, 16 0. & G.R. 813 (1962).
77Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1964).7
"Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1964).
"
8 Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1964).
80An action to cancel a Commission order pursuant to Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
6049c, § 8 (1962) exists only by statute and not by virtue of the Constitution or the
common law. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 186 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref.
See also Alpha Petroleum Co. v. Terrell, 122 Tex. 257, 59 S.W.2d 364 (1933).
s8 Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1964).
8" After the formal conference between the examiner and the Commissioners, the former
sends to all parties in interest a letter which constitutes the temporary order of the
Commission. The date of this order becomes the effective date of the formal Commission or-
der issued later. See Greenhill & McGinnis, Practice and Procedure in Oil and Gas Hearings
in Texas, 18 Sw. L.J. 406, 431 (1964). The formal order of April 24, 1961, in Alcoa
was made effective as of January 20, 1961, by the letter order.




all former orders were rescinded. The substance of these prior orders,
however, remained unchanged, thus maintaining the consistent one-
third per well-two-thirds acreage formula for gas throughout, since
the aggregation was merely for the sake of clarity and convenience
of administration. No rehearing was sought; however, Alcoa brought
suit in the district court attacking the order as a whole on April 3."
In both Alcoa and Shell the district court found the orders arbi-
trary, unreasonable, capricious and confiscatory because not sup-
ported by substantial evidence, and set them aside. The Court of
Civil Appeals affirmed both decisions."5 It is worthy of note that
Shell was the first case to apply the Normanna fair share rule to an
order prorating oil production. As might have been anticipated, the
supreme court gave the fifty-fifty oil formula identical treatment
to that afforded gas under the one-third-two-thirds formula. Like-
wise noteworthy was a statement indicating that, contrary to wishful
speculation by large tract owners, adoption of a 100 per cent acreage
factor is not intended to be the sole alternative. "[T]he issue here
drawn is not whether the 50-50 or 100 per cent acreage formula be
adopted.""6 Thus, other less arbitrary formulas short of the latter
criterion are not precluded,"7 a factor of continued direct and indirect
importance under the Pooling Act.
VI. ACQUIESCENCE AND UNREASONABLE DELAY
Although greatly clarified under the Pooling Act," the problem
of timeliness for appeals from Railroad Commission orders was of
major, recent concern under the case law. The indefinite standard
previously employed had the advantages of flexibility and capacity
to do equity under varying circumstances, but it provided no
predictable guide by which to act. The Pooling Act provision is
indeed an innovation in Texas administrative procedure; however,
the recent decisions under the old system are an integral part of a
unique Texas contribution to oil and gas law-the Rule 37 exception.
Moreover, even though case law in the area of timely appeal is of
limited direct applicability under the Pooling Act, many phases of
"4 See Griffin, Mineral Law: Recent Cases of Interest to the Bar, 27 Texas B.J. 781,
816-20 (1964).
"5 Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 368 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963); Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 369 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
86 Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tex. 1964).
87Neither must the formula be based 100% on net acre-feet. "While the Court [in
Halbouty] struck down the particular formula with the large 'per well' factor in it, the
Court did not direct or even hint that a 100 percent acre-foot formula would be the only
acceptable one." Pickens v. Railroad Comm'n, 387 S.W.2d 35, 44 (Tex. 1965) (upholding
a 50% surface acreage-50O acre-foot formula).
88 Section 2 (g) provides for a 30-day appeal period from orders within its scope.
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it will still be applied by analogy, both in interpretation of the
Pooling Act and in other administrative contexts.
The first indication by the Texas Supreme Court that an unreason-
able delay in contesting Commission orders might bar appeal by the
contesting party was in Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co.,"9 in
which the Court said:
It will be noted that section 8 of article 6049c . . . provides no time
within which suit to test the validity of the rules, regulations, and
orders of the Commission shall be filed . . . . The very nature of the
appeal thus provided would make it very difficult for the Legislature
to frame a just statute to apply in all instances. We think, however,
that unreasonable delay in appealing orders pertaining to well permits
which cause the opposite party to act, to his injury, might give rise
to a question of estoppel."
The statute referred to demands only that such suits "be determined
as expeditiously as possible and no postponement thereof or continu-
ance shall be granted except for reasons deemed imperative by the
Court." 1 In Normanna the court indicated that one reason for its
denial of writ of error (with the notation "n. r. e.") in the Hawkins
Field" and Yates Field3 cases was that the large tract owners had
acquiesced in long-established Commission rules for the fields in
question, and other owners had expended large sums of money in
reliance upon those rules. It thereupon concluded, in an important
dictum, that "where producers have acquiesced in and have failed
to complain of the Commission's proration orders for a long period,
during which time other operators have expended vast sums in
exploration and drilling operations, such producers should not be
heard to complain.""4
Realizing this statement to be dictum, the court noted in Alcoa
that "nevertheless it was said deliberately, to put the Commission
and the industry as a whole on notice"95 of the probable status of
the law." The court emphasized the extreme need for stability of
8"134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73 (1939).0 Id. at 85-86. See also Railroad Comm'n v. Mackhank Petroleum Co., 144 Tex. 393,
190 S.W.2d 802 (1945); Midas Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 142 Tex. 417, 179
S.W.2d 243 (1944); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 335 S.W.2d
425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref. n.r.e.; Dunbar v. Fuller, 253 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952) error ref.
"'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6049c, § 8 (1962).
"Railroad Comm'n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 193 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946) error ref. n.r.e.
"Standard Oil Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 215 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)
error ref. n.r.e.
"Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 162 Tex. 274, 288, 346 S.W.2d 801, 811
(1961).
" Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. 1964).
"See text accompanying notes 105 and 106 infra.
[Vol. 19:304
COMMENTS
Commission orders concerning the oil and gas industry."7 A great
deal of confusion and serious injustice would accompany a rescission
of these established formulas and an impossible burden would be
placed on the Commission in determining and administering new
allowables. "It is of vast importance to the industry, as well as to
the property owners in the field and the Commission as the repre-
sentative of the public generally, that proration formulae be as
stable as reasonably possible .... .
By the same token, a permittee should have the assurance of relying
on stable orders. He should not be forced to choose between drilling,
with the possibility of losing his investment due to a later unfavor-
able alteration in allowables, and waiting indefinitely for the con-
testant to bring suit, with the inevitable continuing loss of reserves
through drainage. Drilling is expensive, as is drainage; moreover, the
probable beneficiary of this drainage is the prospective complainant
himself, who therefore has cause to delay. There are, in short, very
practical economic reasons demanding prompt attack of orders regu-
lating the production of oil and gas. The legislature's establishment
of a short appeal period under the Pooling Act evidences its recog-
nition of this need.
In SheWP' the Commission and the small tract owners con-
tended that (1) acquiescence in Rule 37 exception permits for
the tracts in question estopped Shell from attacking proration orders
thereon and (2) separate reservoirs in the same general area should
be treated as one for purposes of determining unreasonable de-
lay, so that prior acquiescence by Shell in allocations for other
fields would estop it in an attack upon the present order. The
supreme court rejected these contentions, however, and held that
Shell did not unreasonably delay in contesting the Commission
order."° First, there is no relationship between an exception permit
and a proration order for any small tract which would bar a party
from attacking one for failure to attack the other, as one order might
easily be objectionable without the other. 1' Moreover, it is now clear
that physically separate reservoirs underlying the same tract are to
" Many individuals and institutions have invested in royalties and other oil and gas
interests. Banks, insurance companies, and other lending agencies have made loans secured
by oil and gas properties and the production therefrom. Municipal and school authorities
often depend on taxes from these properties, which to a large extent affect the entire state
economy.
" Standard Oil Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 215 S.W.2d 633, 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)
error ref. n.r.e.
9 Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1964).
100 Ibid.
'0' Benz-Stoddard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 368 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1963).
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be treated separately."' Thus, the time for judicial attack must run
from the date of adoption of original special field orders for the
particular reservoir in question and not merely those underlying
identical tracts. This will, of course, remain true under the Pooling
Act. Because the court viewed Shell's prosecution of its complaint as
being within a reasonable time after that effective date, it rejected
the Commission's contention of unreasonable delay, laches and
estoppel.s'
In the Alcoa case,'"0 Alcoa contended that the order issued on
January 20, 1961, was actually a new regulation with respect to all
reservoirs because it expressly rescinded all prior orders and there-
fore was subject to attack in its entirety, notwithstanding acquie-
scence by complainant in any of the old orders. Instead, the court
looked through the form of the revised order and held that in sub-
stance, as there were no "changed conditions ' 10 ' and as the prior orders
were unmodified, the petitioners were appealing from orders dating
from as far back as 1956. It then alluded to the dictum in Normanna"'
and concluded that "the holding therein did not require the over-
turning of proration formulas that had been in effect . . . for years
where operators had drilled and completed wells at great expense in
reliance on those formulas and where conditions had become sta-
bilized."'" 7 The court thus found that Alcoa's complaint had not been
made within a reasonable time and, notwithstanding an estimated
value of drainage from Alcoa's property during the life of the field
in excess of nine million dollars, that it could not overturn the ad-
ministrative action of the Commission in denying modifications of
the allowable.'
It can be seen, therefore, that the individual right to one's "fair
share" is overridden by the pervasive necessity of stability and cer-
tainty in the regulation of oil and gas production. The obvious effect
of this determination is to perpetuate the inequity established by the
Commission in all "old pools," an unobjectionable result, however, in
102 Ibid.
1°3Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d at 558.
... Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1964).
... The Commission has continuing power to change or modify prior orders where condi-
tions have changed materially, new and unforeseen problems have arisen, or mistakes have
been discovered. Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 6036a (1962); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
New Process Prod. Co., 129 Tex. 617, 104 S.W.2d 1106 (1937); Railroad Comm'n v.
Shell Oil Co., 369 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Railroad Comm'n v. Humble Oil
& Ref. Co., 193 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.re.
' See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
"°'Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d 599, 601 (1964).
10' The average per acre allowable of the small tracts involved was fifty-five times as
large as the average for large tracts, and in all but one reservoir some eighty per cent of
the town lot production was a direct result of drainage from beneath the large tracts.
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view of the economic and administrative practicalities involved. '
An uncertainty in this regard still exists in connection with wells
drilled after a suit attacking the proration order has been instituted.
Must the large tract operator attack the order itself or may he
also attack the application of the order which ultimately causes the
confiscation? This condition existed in Alcoa, but the question was
not properly before the court. The court, however, did enunciate a
caveat to owners of undrilled small tracts in "old" pools by expressly
reserving its opinion on the issue. It stated, "We are dealing here
with a field-wide rule. Whether or not there is any authority vested
in the Commission to apply exceptions to a field-wide rule in some
cases, that relief is not here sought by Alcoa. They seek to strike
down the order as applicable to the entire field.. 1 . In any event, the
crucial inquiry becomes, when is a pool "old"-i.e., what is an un-
reasonable delay in attacking the allocation?''
Earlier cases have dealt with the timeliness of appeals from various
Commission orders. The Emperor Field case.'. held delay to be un-
reasonable when 1956 proration orders were attacked in 1959 after
forty-six wells had been drilled, pipelines had been laid and the
producing area enlarged. This is an easy case by the court's present
standards, but it emphasizes the point that, except under the Pooling
Act, subsequent reliance on the Commission's orders may be import-
ant."' On the other hand, notice to the permittee of an intention to
"'There is, of course, a vital need for certainty and stability in oil and gas law.
Moreover, as in Halbouty, the large tract owners might have an advantage toward re-
covering 100% of the original oil in place in the old pools through drilling prior to
issuance of the Rule 37 exception permit.
0 Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Tex. 1964).
(Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, the court emphasized the factor of foreseeability by pointing
out that Alcoa must have apreciated the probability of future small tract drilling and drain-
age at the time the order setting an allowable was issued. This would indicate that large tract
operators must anticipate any reasonably foreseeable drainage under the order and object
at that time, even though no small tract drilling operations are then in progress.
... As a result some pools remain impervious to attack, and presumably any undrilled
small tract (or reconstructed voluntary subdivision) in such pools could be drilled under
the existing formula without being amenable to attack.
.' Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 335 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960) error ref. n.r.e.
..s A delay of almost seven months in prosecuting a suit to set aside an order of the
Board of Water Engineers also was held unreasonable as a matter of law in Board of
Water Engineers v. Colorado River Municipal Water Dist. 152 Tex. 77, 254 S.W.2d 369
(1953). This case was cited as directly applying in Alcoa because the language in the
controlling statute for appeals of Water Board orders, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7880-3c,
S F (1954), is identical to that governing appeals from exception and proration orders of
the Commission, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6049c, § 8 (1962). Midas Oil Co. v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 142 Tex. 417, 179 S.W.2d 243 (1944), also was cited; but,
although appeal in Midas after only four months was held not timely, the court in Alcoa
mentioned only the seven-month holding. Apparently this was the result of its recognition
that permit cases (e.g., Midas) are not of direct precedential value in allowable cases be-
cause the former are quasi-judicial in nature and involve vested rights whereas the latter
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contest given four days after issuance of the Commission's order has
been held not to be unreasonable delay, even though suit was not filed
for almost three months and defendant was not served for two
114years.
The companion cases presently under discussion115 more than ever
exemplify the vital importance of a timely complaint to avoid denial
of remedy. One may observe that the gap between the judicially-
determined timely and untimely is narrow indeed, for the difference
between the "reasonable" delay in Shell and the "unreasonable" delay
in Alcoa may be as little as twenty-one days, exactly three weeks."'
The qualification "may" is used because all surrounding factors must
be considered by the court, and it is often difficult or impossible to
determine which factual elements are crucial. In the Alcoa case, the
supreme court made no specific comment on the reservoirs with re-
spect to which the "extension" order of January 20, 1961, was
original-i.e., those to which no special field orders had previously
attached. Alcoa noted in its brief in the supreme court that twenty-
one of the thirty-eight separate gas reservoirs included in the order
of January 30 had not theretofore been placed under special alloca-
tion rules.11' This point was urged more emphatically by Alcoa on
its motion for rehearing. The attorney general, as counsel for the
Railroad Commission, replied that, with the exception of one reser-
voir,"'8 there was no specific or definite evidence of any substantial
damage resulting from the operation of the existing allocation
formulas in these "new" pools.'19 The court did not resolve this ques-
tion, merely holding that the appeal as a whole was not timely
are quasi-legislative in nature, do not involve vested rights and are subject to continuous
supervision of the Commission. Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S.
573 (1940); Chenoweth v. Raliroad Comm'n, 184 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
error ref. The court nevertheless held permit cases to be pertinent. Railroad Comm'n v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex. 1964).
"" Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Trapp, 194 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref.
... Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1964);
Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1964).
"' Six weeks in Shell and nine weeks in Alcoa. See text accompanying notes 79-82 subra.
However, the effective holding could very well be six weeks (three in Shell and nine in
in Alcoa). See note 122 infra. Even if this is the case, there is only a 30-day span between
Alcoa and Pickens v. Railroad Comm'n, 387 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1965) (33 days).
117 Respondents' Brief, p. 9, Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380
S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1964).
11SFault Segment 9, Lower 7600' Sand-effective date of proration order November 1,
1960. Respondents' Brief, p. 9, Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d
599 (Tex. 1964).
"' Concerning these pools, one of Alcoa's expert witnesses had testified: "While wells
in the Palo Alto townsite area at one time produced large quantities of gas, virtually all
of these wells have gone to water and hence only the Carancahua Beach townsite, lying
in Fault Segments 5 and 6, and the .81 acre tract lying in Fault Segment 2, are of im-
portance in this case."
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brought.'20 In short, the effective holding appears to be that nine
weeks' delay in bringing suit is unreasonable, particularly if drilling
operations are being prosecuted in reliance on the order under
attack.12'
An enigma in the Shell case lies in the effect of a motion for re-
hearing before the Commission-i.e., does it extend the time for
filing suit in the state district court? Although the Pooling Act does
provide for appeals from its orders within thirty days, no mention
is made of the effect of filing a motion for rehearing nor even of the
time from which the thirty-day period is to run."' Thus, while
making some headway, the legislature has not completed its task of
clarification regarding appeals. The usual rule of administrative law
is that one must exhaust all administrative remedies before he may
maintain an action in a court of law. 2 Presumably, then, fairness
would dictate that one who is evidently required to expend part
of the short appeal period pursuing the administrative remedy of
rehearing should not be penalized thereby, and that his time would
be extended to that degree. However, Mr. Justice Greenhill and
Robert C. McGinnis observed in their recent article on Railroad
Commission oil and gas hearings that "It has been held that the
filing of a motion for rehearing is not a prerequisite to commencing
a suit to test the validity of a Commission order; the administrative
remedy is considered to be exhausted without filing a motion for
rehearing.""' Moreover, the effective date of a Commission order in
most instances is unaltered by the filing of a motion for rehearing."'
Together, these two factors argue against any extension of time by
12 It is submitted that in light of Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex. 417, 357
S.W.2d 364 (1962), in which the court held that the large tract owners' recovery of 100%
of their original reserves by virtue of early drilling was no defense, lack of substantial re-
serves likewise should be no defense. Indeed, of the remaining potential production, there
still will be proportionately the same pro-rata injury to Alcoa. Moreover, by deciding on
the basis of unreasonable delay, the court never reached the question of injury.
... The effective holding otherwise would be that 22 weeks' delay was unreasonable.
See date in note 118 supra and accompanying text.
12 Presumably the period will continue to run from the date of issuance of a "temporary
order," as was true under the case law.
"23"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . is well established
[and] is a cardinal principle of practically universal application." 2 Am. Jur. 2d S 595
(1963). For voluminous citations see Ibid.
"2 Greenhill & McGinnis, Practice and Procedure in Oil and Gas Hearings in Texas,
18 Sw. L.J. 406, 434-35 (1964). See also Trapp v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 170 S.W.2d 506,
510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.; Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Chamber of Com-
merce, 124 Tex. 375, 78 S.W.2d 591, 595 (1935).
" ,"In oil and gas hearings other than Rule 37 [exception permit] matters, the filing
of a motion for rehearing does not suspend the order automatically until the motion has
been disposed of. The Commission usually grants a rehearing without suspending the effective-




such action, although no definite conclusion can be drawn at this
time.
If one assumes, however, that the filing of a motion for rehearing
does not extend the time for judicial appeal, the result in Shell was
that a delay of forty-two days was not unreasonable.' Although the
Court may not wish to so restrict itself, a workable criterion appears
possible approaching the same result. In appealing from a state dis-
trict court judgment, notice of appeal must be filed within ten days,"27
an appeal bond within thirty days,""8 and a statement of facts within
fifty days. 2 ' Because no record of the Commission hearing need be
filed, the time for initiating the suit attacking an allocation formula
probably should fall within this fifty-day period. It is submitted
that a reliable standard would be a maximum of forty days from
date of issuance of the temporary letter order. This period might be
extended in a particular case if, at the end of that time, no one
had undertaken drilling operations in reliance on the order. On the
other hand, if any small tract owner were proceeding with drilling
operations by that time, thereby incurring substantial liability, any
further delay in appeal would be imprudent. As a corollary, a small
tract owner should not be able to impose upon the complainant any
more stringent requirements by immediate drilling within this period.
The owner would not be "justified" in relying on the order imme-
diately, without allowing a reasonable time for complaint. Likewise,
any wells drilled prior to issuance of the allocation order should not
have the effect of reducing the reasonable time period. The Hal-
bouty2° case tends to support this conclusion. In that instance, pro-
duction was obtained on the small tracts prior to issuance of the
proration order, apparently under the assumption that the Commis-
sion would "extend" the prevailing one-third-two-thirds formula
to include their reservoir, as it had done prior to the Normanna de-
cision. This substantial premature expenditure apparently did not
reduce the time period, which amounted to a timely thirty-nine days.
It should be noted, however, that any drilling in anticipation of the
Commission's field order for a particular reservoir is now highly
improbable, in light of Normanna.
In contrast to the variable standard of reasonableness applying
"' On the other hand, if the rehearing period does extend the appeal time, the effective
holding is that 21 days after final disposition of the motion for rehearing is soon enough.
It has subsequently been held, however, that delay of 33 days was not unreasonable.
Pickens v. Railroad Comm'n, 387 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1965).127 Tex. R. Civ. P. 353.
'STex. R. Civ. P. 356.1 29Tex. R. Civ. P. 381.
'
5
°Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex. 417, 357 S.W.2d 364 (1962).
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to appeals from other Commission orders, the Pooling Act establishes
an absolute limit of thirty days. Although the event from which
this period runs is not specified, the time requirement is tied to
the order itself and therefore should not be influenced by the pres-
ence or absence of drilling in reliance on that order. In this respect
the Pooling Act establishes a definite standard, but at the expense of
flexibility and, in many cases, equity.
VII. REVOCATION AND AMENDMENT OF FIELD ORDERS
The Texas statutes"'. supply the courts' jurisdiction to consider the
validity of orders of the Railroad Commission." 2 This authority is
limited, however, by the substantial evidence rule and extends only
to the issue of validity. The court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the Commission regarding the nature of the appropriate
new order. Furthermore, it now should be clear that the courts do
not act under certain circumstances giving rise to the defense of
laches, estoppel or unreasonable delay. Neither may they act after
thirty days under the Pooling Act. 3' Notwithstanding these judicial
limitations, the Commission has continuing jurisdiction over its field
orders,"' except under the Pooling Act. It may revoke or amend any
rule, regulation or order previously promulgated; "' the effect of the
revocation is to nullify its prior action. "' As a consequence, it is
possible that the Commission could alter allocation formulas in "old"
pools notwithstanding the courts' inability to do so. Needless to say,
the likelihood of this result to any substantial extent is remote, al-
though it was done in the Fairway Field subsequent to the Normanna
decision." '
In those cases in which the judiciary revokes a prior Commission
order, the governing rule during the iterim, if any, between the re-
"'. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6049c, § 8 (1962).
'.' Alpha Petroleum Co. v. Terrell, 122 Tex. 257, 59 S.W.2d 364 (1933); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 186 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref.
13 Section 2 (g).
"'"If conditions change, rights change, and the governing statutes place the matter
of ascertaining such rights and determining the facts thereto in the first instance under
the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission." Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. New Process
Prod. Co., 129 Tex. 617, 104 S.W.2d 1106, 1111 (1937).
".. Provided the subject matter of the change was considered at the previous hearing.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. New Process Prod. Co., 129 Tex. 617, 104 S.W.2d 1106 (1937);
Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 369 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963),aff'd, 380
S.W.2d 556 (1964); Railroad Comm'n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 193 S.W.2d 824
(Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e.
" Railroad Comm'n v. Miller, 165 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
13 In Pickens v. Railroad Comm'n, 387 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1965), a 50% well-50%
acreage formula had been issued prior to Normanna. After that latter decision the Commis-
sion withdrew its original order and instituted a 100% surface acreage allowable. In Novem-
ber and December of 1962 it held a new hearing and on March 6, 1963, promulgated the
50% surface acreage-50% acre-foot formula which was upheld by the supreme court.
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vocation and the issuance of a new order must be determined. Article
6036a... provides for an emergency order to be issued in the Commis-
sion's discretion, upon application, and contemplates a hearing within
fifteen days after issuance. The temporary order continues in force
until the Commission issues its rule, regulation or order pursuant to
the hearing, but in no case will the temporary order last longer than
fifteen days. Such a brief period ordinarily would not suffice for
the complete formulation of new orders,' but presumably in the
future the Commission will gather information in advance to expe-
dite the hearing, anticipating the possibility that the court will over-
turn the original order (in the one-third-two-thirds gas and fifty-
fifty oil cases this is inevitable, absent unreasonable delay).
VIII. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE POOLING ACT
The result effected by the new Normanna Field Order " has been
termed "judicial compulsory pooling" because the large-tract owner
must either accept a reasonable pooling offer made by a small-tract
owner or allow the latter the benefit of a somewhat liberal allowable.
Although the supreme court has not yet expressly upheld the Nor-
manna Order, it indicated an awareness thereof in the Halbouty
opinion, which intentionally left a channel open for approval of the
Normanna-type order."' However, for several reasons this judicial
pooling is unsatisfactory.
Most importantly, it makes possible the continued drilling of un-
necessary wells, in contradiction of the fundamental Commission
purpose of preventing waste. It is inequitable to remote large-tract
owners who have no opportunity to protect themselves from drain-
age by pooling the small tract. Moreover, at least at the present time,
it is uncertain whether the special allowables will be upheld in the
supreme court. Furthermore, the system provides no fixed standards
by which the Commission may determine if an offer to pool has been
fair and reasonable, particularly with respect to percentage participa-
tion in income and expenses. Also, it may not be possible to force
lessors, under leases without pooling clauses, to allow pooling of
leased acreage under this arrangement. 4 ' Since the right to drill is
a prerequisite to the granting of an exception permit, the owner of
.. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6036a (1962).
3'For example, in Normanna the hearing was held on August 14, 1961, after notice,
but the new field order was not issued until September 27, 1961.
14o See note 60 supra.
141 See Hardwicke & Woodward, Fair Share and the Small Tract in Texas, 41 Texas
L. Rev. 75, 96-99 (1962).




the mineral rights in a tract which is the product of a "voluntary
subdivision" is powerless to utilize the judicial compulsory pooling
procedure "' because the threat of production under a "special" allow-
able is the sole impetus to "voluntary" pooling. For the same reason,
a small tract owner or his lessee who is financially unable to drill
cannot force a pooling. At any rate, the basic conflict between rule
of capture and ownership in place, manifest throughout, cannot be
resolved except by statute. For some time authorities in this area
have recommended the enactment of a compulsory pooling statute
in Texas.'"
The existence of this slipshod system of judicially forced pooling,
coupled with a great deal of compromising, finally engendered a
pooling bill which encountered little opposition. 4' Decisions by the
courts in this area had necessarily been ad hoc in nature, the courts
considering and balancing all equities. In order to maintain the needed
stability and at the same time provide definite, predictable standards,
the legislature, on February 24, 1965, enacted the "Mineral Interest
Pooling Act." The Pooling Act was thus the natural outgrowth of
judicial pooling. It went into effect August 30 and will apply to
all pools produced subsequent to March 8, 1961.' 6 An important
effect of the statute, as was true under the case law, will be the encour-
agement of voluntary pooling arrangements, since it continues the
"reasonable offer to voluntary pool" prerequisite originated in the
second Normanna order. 4" The incentive for large tract operators to
take voluntary action is different, however, than under the old sys-
tem. Previously, the stimulus was the fear of a small tract "special
allowable," whereas now it will be the desire to "tailor-make" the
143 This shortcoming also gives rise to inequities in "reconstituted tracts", as in Ryan
Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221, 185 S.W.2d 201 (1956), which will
be rectified under statutory compulsory pooling.
144Hardwicke & Woodward, supra note 141;Myers, Pooling and Unitization § 8.01(3)
(Supp. 1963) (citing Professor Huie and William J. Murray, Chairman of the Railroad
Commission, for similar proposals); A. W. Walker, Jr., speech delivered on September 29,
1964, before the Texas Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association. Thirty-one states now have
compulsory pooling or unitization laws.
" This is the T1PRO (Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association)
Pooling Bill, approved September 15, 1964. This bill was adopted by the Committee for
Equitable Development of Texas Oil and Gas Resources (CEDOT) on September 28, 1964.
The Texas Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association also favored compulsory pooling in
general but not any specific proposal.
'46 Section 2 (f).
... Section 2(a). See note 60 supra and accompanying text. The Act specifies certain
provisions which would be per se unreasonable in either an offer to pool or a pooling
order, to wit, the granting of preferential rights, calls, or options, district or central office
charges and prohibitions against nonoperators questioning the operation of the unit. It
should be noted that where the small tract owner is attempting to join a unit which
is "equal to or in excess of the standard proration unit acreage for the reservoir," he must
show not only that he has made "a fair and reasonable offer to voluntarily pool" but also
that he has not been provided "a reasonable opportunity to pool voluntarily."
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pooling arrangement without interference by the Commission and
the Pooling Act. The substitution is a desirable one because it avoids
the wasteful drilling of unnecessary wells, a major defect in the prior
system. Furthermore, the small tract owner now has a means of
recovering his fair share even if he is financially unable to drill an
entire well or has no right to do so (e.g., a voluntary subdivision).
Again following the Normanna Order, the statute allocates per-
centages of participation in production proceeds on a surface acreage
basis in absence of special conditions; 4 this should be a reasonably
simple system to administer. The fundamental concept from which
the Pooling Act develops is the rather nebulous one of a "proration
unit." Although there have been cases considering noncontiguous
acreage to be within the scope of that term,'49 the newly added Rule
39 (A) of the June 1, 1964, revision of Commission rules declares,
"Proration and drilling units established for individual wells drilled
or to be drilled shall consist of acreage which is contiguous.""'  Ex-
ceptions can and will be made, however, where unusual conditions
warrant them. These will be more frequent with respect to the large
gas units in areas containing tracts of irregular shapes and sizes,
characteristic of Texas. In such limited circumstances it may be
possible for an owner to improve his position by selective pooling
with nonadjacent tracts in the common reservoir.
Another interesting provision follows the approach of its New
Mexico counterpart. It gives nonconsenting owners (mineral owners
not desirous of pooling their acreage but forced to do so at the in-
stance of another owner) the option to pay their proportion of drill-
ing expenses as incurred by the operator or to be carried by the
operator, whose only recourse for expense reimbursement would be
to actual production."' In the latter instance, however, the operator
is entitled to a "charge for risk" out of production in addition to
actual expenses, as determined by the Commission, but not to exceed
100 per cent of all drilling and completing costs attributable to the
non-drilling party's acreage."'
The procedural steps for filing under the Pooling Act are relatively
simple. The owner of acreage which "reasonably appears to lie within
148 Section 2 (d).
" See for example Railroad Comm'n v. Williams, 163 Tex. 370, 356 S.W.2d 131 (1962).
"'Rule 39(A), Texas Railroad Comm'n Rules & Regs., § 1, at 19 (June 1964).
However, this seems to have been the practice even before the adoption of this rule.
'51 Section 2 (d).
... Ibid. It should be noted that the literal language of the statute would indicate that
100% of all drilling and completing costs could be added as a "charge for risk." However,
this would be indeed unique among pooling statutes and will probably not result.
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the productive limits of the reservoir, ' wherein the Commission
has established field rules, enters his application for a proposed "pro-
ration unit" and alleges that he has made a fair and reasonable offer
to voluntarily pool. At least thirty days' notice must be given to all
interested parties, which notice may be by publication in certain
limited instances.'a" Thereafter, a hearing is held "upon such terms
and conditions as are just and reasonable, and will afford to the
owner or owners of each tract or interest in the unit the opportunity
to produce or receive his fair share.'. If the Commission finds that
there has been a reasonable offer to pool and that drilling operations on
the proposed unit are being prosecuted or are contemplated, it will
issue a pooling order thereon. The unit is automatically dissolved,
however, if no drilling operations have commenced within one year
after the effective date of the order.' Suits contesting orders under
this Pooling Act are not instituted in Travis County, where venue lies
for contesting other Commission orders, but rather in the district
court of the county in which the unit, or any part thereof, is lo-
cated.157
Although the question of reasonable time period for appealing
proration and exception permit orders still exists, the Pooling Act
specifies a thirty-day period for attacking orders "effecting pooling
under this Act. 1.. This constitutes an important step toward cer-
tainty not previously present in the statutes relating to appeals from
administrative orders in this state. Furthermore, the Commission has
no continuing jurisdiction in this area, because, in most instances,
"[a] unit established by order of the Commission under ... this Act
may not subsequently be modified or dissolved without the consent of
all parties affected. . . .""' This provision promises to present inter-
pretive difficulties. Does it include modification of the provisions of
the order itself or only the size and composition of the unit? The
former interpretation, though problematical, will in all likelihood
prevail.'"
1
53 Section 2 (a).
"" Section 2 (c).
.5 Section 2 (d).
1" Section 2 (e). It is likewise dissolved six months after completion of a dry hole or
cessation of production.
117 Section 2 (g).
15 Ibid.
15s Section 2 (e).
" Substantial windfalls could result, for example, if it were later discovered that tracts
of one or more unit members in fact lay outside the reservoir or contained substantially
fewer acre-feet than originally estimated. The latter situation certainly could not be
rectified. In the former, it could be argued that the original order was void ab initio
by virtue of the language in S 2 (a): "When two or more separately owned tracts of
land are embraced within a common reservoir. . .. ." Nevertheless, the thirty-day time
limitation on contests of orders under the Act might be raised as a defense.
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Although the Pooling Act does provide substantial changes in the
law, it is applicable only to pools discovered and produced after
March 8, 1961, the date Normanna was handed down.' 1 Thus earlier-
discovered pools still will be governed by the principles enunciated
by the courts, and a future Rule 37 exception well remains a possi-
bility. Post-Normanna pools, however, are encompassed by the Pool-
ing Act, even to the extent of already producing wells. Nevertheless,
a Rule 37 exception well could exist even in new pools should adjacent
large tract owners refuse to pool.' This fact should pose problems
with respect to pools discovered between Normanna and passage of
the Pooling Act, especially in connection with Rule 37 exception
wells."' Although the Pooling Act is primarily designed for use by
small tract owners, there seems to be no reason why a large tract
operator with less than the standard "proration unit" could not
implement the statute to pool a Rule 37 exception well in a post-
Normanna reservoir. If he cannot, however, a very broad area for
application of prior judicial authority would still exist. Thus, opera-
tors like Alcoa may still have a recourse in the Pooling Act, not-
withstanding their unreasonable delay in contesting Commission
orders under the previous system.
Petroleum law in Texas is entering a new era, and, as was true
under "judicial compulsory pooling" subsequent to Normanna, the
transition may prove problematical. Although there presently exists
a theater in which the previously discussed judicial authority still is
applicable, it is certain that a final clarification of the many in-
tricacies of the Rule 37 exception well in Texas will never evolve.
161 Section 2 (f).
162 The Commission might deny a permit on grounds that the compulsory pooling remedy
is still available, but there is no evidence of any legislative intent that the statutory
remedy be mandatory.
163 Several possible combinations of problems exist. If a large tract and an exception
tract adjoin, there may have been no wells drilled on either, in which case either party
will probably have no trouble obtaining a compulsory pooling order. Diflficulty increases
where one tract does have a producing well, and the most problematical situation of all
arises where both tracts contain wells. Applications in many of these last situations may
quite possibly be denied.
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